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. Robinson [Appearing below is the second of three articles in a series titled "Transition in El
Salvador." The first appeared in the 08/21/91 issue of the Update, and the third is scheduled for
publication in the 08/28/91 issue.] The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has
undergone a remarkable process of adjustment in its 12 years of existence, shedding orthodoxy,
pragmatically adapting to new national and international realities, and modernizing its outlook and
concepts. Through this process, the FMLN has not only retained its vitality as one of the strongest
organizations of the revolutionary left in Latin America, but has forged for itself a central role
in Salvadoran society in the era of perestroika, the collapse of communism in Europe, and the
disorientation of much of the traditional left elsewhere. The FMLN was formed in 1980 by the union
of five political-military organizations that had engaged in sporadic armed struggle in the 1970s: the
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) and its military wing, the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL);
the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), a 1970 breakaway from the PCS; the People's Revolutionary
Army (ERP); the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN); and the Salvadoran branch of the
Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC). Although each articulated a different
version of revolutionary strategy and tactics, and distinct regional and international alignments,
the five organizations shared an outlook as "the vanguard" of the Salvadoran revolution, which
would militarily overthrow the oligarchic dictatorship, install a revolutionary regime, create a
"Peoples Army" of its own forces, and initiate a "transition to socialism." In January 1981, the FMLN
launched its "final offensive," expecting to spark a popular uprising and mass desertions in the
government army. The offensive failed to produce the expected results due to timely US military
backing for the government, lack of sufficient urban support for an insurrection, and infighting
within the FMLN. Following the abortive "final offensive," the FMLN entered into a period of
strategic retreat. A combination of mass repression in the cities and the advent of a Christian
Democratic reformist movement severed the Front from much of its urban social base. The FMLN
withdrew to the countryside, where it was held at bay during 1981-1983 by the US-sponsored
counterinsurgency campaign, but managed to develop rearguards and sophisticated military
structures, moving from a popular movement to a popular army. In 1984-1988 the Front reorganized
for prolonged irregular warfare, breaking down big detachments assembled in the earlier period
into mobile units, developing a nation-wide clandestine network of militia and collaborators,
establishing zones of control and "dual power" in large areas of the countryside. By 1986, the FMLN
had achieved a situation of "strategic equilibrium" with the regime. However, military flexibility
alone does not account for the FMLN's vitality. (The Peruvian Sendero Luminoso, for instance,
has demonstrated similar military agility.) Rather, the Front's strength is derived from its ability to
rise above sectarian beliefs and mechanistic thinking, and to evolve politically in consonance with
changing circumstances. FMLN "New Thinking" During the mid-1980s (and long before perestroika
shook the Soviet Union), the FMLN began its own "new thinking." This "rethinking" culminated
in 1988, when the FMLN definitively abandoned its strategy of conquering power through armed
struggle (although such an outcome was not ruled out). At the same time, the Front developed
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new concepts on the nature of power and the prospects for social change in Salvadoran society. In
early 1989 the FMLN launched what it called a "strategic counteroffensive," putting into practice
its new thinking. In January, the Front formally dropped a longstanding demand that the army had
to be dissolved, and the regime replaced by a provisional government and "power sharing." The
organization declared its willingness to cease hostilities, recognize the government, participate in
electoral processes and abide by their results, so long as minimal political and security conditions
could be established to allow it to seriously contend in the electoral arena. "We (no longer) seek a
quota of power, but space and guarantees to compete for power," explained Commander Joaquin
Villalobos of the FMLN National Directorate. Although this "counteroffensive" involved increased
urban guerrilla actions, reconcentration of forces in the countryside, and a series of limited military
offensives, its heart was the articulation of a redefined political project: development of a broad,
multi-class alliance in favor of a negotiated end to the war, demilitarization, democratization and
reconstruction. In this scenario, the FMLN has not renounced armed struggle, but sees revolutionary
violence as necessary to force negotiations and open democratic political space in which the rebel
struggle can be transferred to a less violent terrain. (However, should the negotiated alternative
not materialize, the FMLN has not ruled out attempting an armed insurrection. Feasibility of such
strategy has provoked fierce debate among the Salvadoran armed and unarmed left as well as
outside analysts.) As part of the "counteroffensive," Villalobos, the FMLN's leading theoretician,
published a series of articles in Latin and North America and Europe, which spelled out the FMLN's
new positions. This included an oft-cited essay in the journal "Foreign Policy," considered one of
the most important forums for discussion within the Washington power establishment on US policy
options and strategies. The article, titled "A Democratic Revolution for El Salvador," argued that
the time had come for a negotiated outcome around "regulated capitalism, popular reform and
multi-party pluralism with participatory democracy," an arrangement which could become the
basis for accommodation between the FMLN, the country's traditional elite, and the US. "At first
we Salvadoran revolutionaries were ideologically rigid," said Villalobos. "But later new conditions
offered us the opportunity to develop our own thinking. The FMLN is proposing an open, pluralist
project, one which is rooted in our domestic and geopolitical reality. What is fundamental is not
ideological definition, but whether or not it resolves El Salvador's problems...In El Salvador, to carry
out an agrarian reform, parallel with the development of a pluralist democracy which benefits the
majority, is to make revolution." In this "revolution," he stated, the private capitalist sector should
not disappear, but rather "operate in a new structural context...Our objective is development. In
today's world, a combination of the private and public sectors can lead to a more rapid development
of Salvadoran society than a supposedly more radical and closed model." Although the FMLN has
not forsaken socialism as a long- term vision, the first step is a program "of economic modernization
which is nothing more than the development of capitalism in El Salvador," says FMLN Commander
Ferman Cienfuegos. "We first have to develop our minimal program, then later look for the bases
to construct socialism." Revolution and elections The changes in FMLN thinking altered the entire
political landscape, gaining the FMLN renewed credibility in domestic and international forums.
Such changes brought the Front closer to the positions of popular, trade union and social groups
in El Salvador, and legitimized a negotiated solution as the alternative to continued war. Also in
1989, left-leaning political parties, mainly associated with the FMLN's strategic ally, the civilian
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), formed the "Democratic Convergence" (CD) coalition, and
decided to participate in the March 1989 national elections. At the time, CD leader Ruben Zamora
commented: "The counterinsurgency project up until 1985 was on the ascent. But after 1985, instead
of playing the role of stabilizing and legitimizing the project, elections started destabilizing the
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project." The FMLN itself was reaching a similar conclusion. "Elections conceived as a fundamental
political component of low intensity warfare strategy are creating instability while working more
against the counterinsurgency plan than for it," wrote Villalobos in 1988. "The elections cannot
stop the social explosion nor realign the correlation of forces in favor of the counterinsurgency
plan. They represent little in the face of such a large-scale political and economic crisis and the
current dimensions of the war." In 1991, the FMLN decided for the first time that it would not
boycott the legislative elections scheduled for March of that year. The rebels believe they must
transform their military power into political power, and, given peace negotiations, the rebirth
of diverse organized political forces in civil society and impending electoral contests, they must
do so quickly or risk the loss of opportunities and a decline in influence. The FMLN envisions
itself as participating in a broad multi-class coalition in favor of a progressive political platform
for demilitarization, democratization and development. Within such coalition, the revolutionary
left is not "the vanguard" but rather a major player which contributes content. "Experience has
taught us that it is not necessary to be in the government in order to open up political space and
win concessions from the government," says Commander Ana Guadalupe Martinez, a member of
the FMLN negotiating team. "Our idea is not to participate (in the 1994 elections) running our own
candidates, but rather in coalitions in which programs, and not individuals, are fundamental." In
the FMLN's vision, El Salvador is entering a transition period which will continue through, and
beyond the 1994 elections. "Civil society and political struggle are the things which will come out
stronger at the end of this process," states another FMLN leader, Jose Melendez ("Comandante
Jonas"). "Confrontation will pass from weapons to the terrain of ideas. When the armed apparatus
disappears as a means of coercion, the political and social struggle, the broad debate of ideas
will become stronger." Another member of the FMLN Central Command, Eduardo Sancho,
recently wrote: "A remarkable and unprecedented process of social and political organization
has taken place in El Salvador. In the face of this process, (the FMLN) has come to accept a broad
leadership shared among the multiple social and political movements, in a new and evolving
pluralist situation...[This implies] a collective, or shared vanguard in other words, not an organic
but rather a political articulation of numerous groups which in practice become the leadership
forces for political, economic and social change." The FMLN's political platform The FMLN has
presented three political platforms in the past decade. In 1980, the Front issued a "Proposal for
a "Democratic Revolutionary Government," and in 1984 a "Platform for a Government of Broad
Participation." In September 1990, the earlier programs were replaced by a broadly-publicized new
statement of principles and aims of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement. The new program
not only summarizes the FMLN's view of how Salvadoran society may realistically be transformed
in this new period, and also reflects the rebels' current positions at the negotiating table. The
document, titled "The Democratic Revolution," states that the end of militarism and the creation of
a new social and economic order are "the two fundamental components of balance in the rules of
a democratic political system which puts the rights and duties of all sectors on an equal footing."
The FMLN is not seeking to "impose itself" on El Salvador, stated the document, "but to bring an
end to militarism and the power of imposition, revalidate civil society and carry out...a series of
far-reaching changes in the political and economic system." The platform establishes four tenets
for "a democratic and national revolution": an end to militarism; new economic and social order;
national democratization; and, recovery of sovereignty. It defines an end to militarism not as the
replacement of the government army by the rebel army, but by the disappearance of both. "Society's
total demilitarization (requires that) there cannot be any kind of army in our democracy; we must
all bid farewell to arms." "Economic and social democracy" is defined as "an end to the oligarchy's
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economic hegemony and the concentration of national wealth" through "peasant-oriented agrarian
reform," the creation of collective and pluralistic forms of property ownership "putting a significant
sector of the economy in the hands of rural and urban workers," urban reform to democratize
urban property ownership, "an economically strong state" which is not conceived as the owner of
means of production, but as an instrument for economic democratization and for social welfare.
"National Democratization" is defined as the establishment of a "representative, participatory and
pluralist political system" through "the broadening of the legislative branch and democratization
of municipal power," an independent and impartial judiciary; total respect for human rights; total
freedom of expression and "freedom to organize, mobilize and protest," electoral democracy, and
"a new constitution to set the foundations for this democracy." All these changes are compatible
with good relations with the United States, said the FMLN document, based on "mutual respect,"
the recovery of national sovereignty, and a foreign policy rooted in "Central American integration
and Latin Americanism," "multi-polar" international relations and a policy of neutrality. The FMLN
program will probably not become a government program per se, but its tenets will no doubt
influence the policies and programs of whatever government, or governing coalition, emerges from
a successful culmination of the current peace process. Revolution and democracy In its theoretical
outlook, the latest program reflects important concepts being debated among the "new left" in
Latin America, including "economic democratization" meaning democratization of property
ownership among broad sectors of society rather than nationalization of the means of production;
the importance of independent social movements and the exercise of power through civil society,
which utilizes and pressures the state and not vice-versa; the decentralization of formal political
power; the creation of multi-class alliances and "concertacion" processes as mechanisms for
reaching social consensus; and, full political liberties and electoral democracy. Perhaps the heart
of the FMLN's revised conceptions is its vision of the relation between revolution and democracy
the banner that the "New Latin American Left" has raised for the 1990s. The FMLN characterizes
the "transition period" in El Salvador as the "Democratic Revolution," in which the country "is in
the stage of constructing the political, economic and social bases for a Democratic Republic." It was
fitting that Villalobos chose the recently concluded Congress of Nicaragua's Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) as the forum to make the following assertion: "For years we have been
told that democracy means that all can accede to government, but the history of our America is
full of electoral fraud, coups and governments that cannot govern, democratic leaders who have
been worn out, revolutionary or democratic parties that have been destroyed trying to accede to
government but without having power, faced with oligarchies and militaries who do have power
but without always having the government... "The history of Eastern Europe made it crystal clear
that absolute power is an error and that people do not live by bread alone. There is no democracy
without revolution and no revolution without democracy."

-- End --
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